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1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a controversy that involves the law of insurance. On August 18, 2007
Michael Brookbank was driving southbound on 3500 East in Twin Falls County when a
dog ran out into the road from the driveway of M. Wilmoth Kinsey's residence and
collided with Mr. Brookbank's motorcycle:' (R. 55).

Mr. Brookbank crashed and

sustained personal injuries. Id. The dog was owned by Jamey Kinsey, M. Wilmoth
Kinsey's grandson. Id. The central issue in this case is whether Jamey Kinsey is a
"resident" of his grandmother's household in order to determine if there is insurance
coverage for Jamey Kinsey. If Jamey Kinsey is not covered then he is judgment proof.

6. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DISPOSITION
On October 1, 2007 Michael Brookbank filed a complaint against Jamey Kinsey
to recover the damages he sustained from the collision which occurred on August 18,
2007. (R.54).

On April 14, 2008, M. Wilmoth Kinsey's insurance company, Farm

Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm Bureau") filed a verified complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment that Jamey Kinsey was not an "insured" under his
grandmother's insurance policy and that Farm Bureau was not obligated to defend
Jamey Kinsey. (R.8). In its verified complaint, Farm Bureau alleged that at the time of
the incident Jamey Kinsey was staying in an outbuilding located at 3497 East 3000
North in Kimberly, Idaho; this is his grandmother's address. (R.8).
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PlaintiffiAppellant Michael Brookbank became aware of Farm Bureau's complaint
for declaratory judgment and sought to intervene in that case. Mr. Brookbank filed a
motion to intervene in the declaratory action. (R.4). The parties eventually stipulated to
allow Mr. Brookbank to intervene. (R.4). Shortly thereafter Farm Bureau filed a motion
for summary judgment. Jamey Kinsey did not file a memorandum in opposition. Instead,
Mr. Brookbank filed a cross motion for summary judgment asserting that Jamey Kinsey
was a resident of M. Wilmoth's household at the time of the incident and therefore was
covered as an "insured under the insurance policy.
On June 8, 2009 the district court heard oral argument on the cross motions for
summary judgment. On June 10, 2009 the court issued its written opinion on the cross
motions.

(R. 124). The court held that Jamey Kinsey was not a "resident" of M.

Wilmoth's household and as such he was not covered under the Farm Bureau policy.

(R. 138). Plaintiff Michael Brookbank filed this instant appeal seeking a reversal of the
lower court's erroneous decision.
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wilmoth Kinsey is the named insured on the Farm Bureau policy that is at issue
in this case. (R. 128). Wilmoth Kinsey's residence is located at 3497 East 3000 North,
Kimberly, Idaho. (R. 99). Wilmoth is also the grandmother of Jamey Kinsey. (R. 115).
There are approximately four houses located on the property described as 3497
East 3000 North in Kimberly, Idaho ("Kinsey Farm"). (R. 100). Wilmoth Kinsey's
children and their families resided in the houses on the property. (R. 107-2). Jamey
Kinsey grew up on the Kinsey Farm where he lived with his father after his parents'
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divorce in 1972. (R. 105,115). After graduating from high school he worked for Terry
Hollifield for 2 -3 years and lived in the bunkhouse on his grandmother's farm. (R.115).
Between 1990 and 1992 Jamey was enlisted in the Navy, presumably away from home.
(R.115). After he got out of the Navy in 1992, Jamey returned to Kimberly and went to

CSI and also worked on the farm. (R.115). Between 1997 and 2001 Jamey worked in
the oil fields in Colorado, he "bounced all over the country," and at one point lived with
his mother in Texas. (R.115). Afterward, Jamey left Texas and returned home to ldaho
sometime around 2001. (R.115). When he returned to ldaho he lived in the house with
his grandmother, Wilmoth Kinsey. ( R . l l l ) .
On August 18, 2007 Mr. Brookbank collided with Mr. Kinsey's dog on 3500 ~ a s t ,
a country road located in Twin Falls County, ldaho. (R.119). Jamey Kinsey was staying
in an outbuilding located at the Kinsey Farm when Mr. Brookbank collided with the dog.
(R. 8). In fact, on August 18, 2007, Jamey was at his grandmother's house looking for a

pair of his work boots. (R.72). At the time of the accident, deputies from the Twin Falls
County Sheriff's Office were called to the scene of the accident in response to a 91 1 call
made by Jamey Kinsey. (R.73). The police officers generated an accident report that
listed "Jamey Kinsey" as the owner of the dog, Jamey's address on the report was listed
as 3497 East 3000 North, Kimberly, Idaho. (R.92).
Additionally, Jamey kept his personal property in his grandmother's bunkhouse
or in her home. (R.71). Jamey's grandmother also safeguarded Jamey's money, paid
his bills and ensured that he keeps his vehicle registration current. (R.74). Jamey's
vehicle title and registration lists his address as "3497 East 3000 North, Kimberly,
APPEALLANT BRIEF - 3

Idaho." (R.94). Furthermore, Jamey's driver's license lists his address as "3497 East
3000 North, Kimberly, Idaho." In fact, Jamey's discovery response lists Jamey's address
as "3497 E 3000 N, Kimberly, ID 83341." (R.61).
The only time Jamey Kinsey has ever stated a different address was at his
deposition held on November 3, 2008 when he stated that his address was "333 Rock
Creek Road, Hansen, Idaho" - the same address as his girlfriend (R.67). At that
deposition, Jamey was asked why he did not want to concede that his address was his
grandmother's address, Jamey replied: "That's the truth. Yeah, the Kinsey ranch had
nothing to do with this, at all, whatsoever. And I know you're after the insurance out
there, so that's just not kosher."(~.74).

II.
ISSUESPRESENTEDOIVAPPEAL
1. Did the trial court err in resolving the "resident" ambiguity in the insurance
contract in favor of insurer Farm Bureau?

I~I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court is asked to review the district court's ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. This Court employs the same standard employed by the district court when
originally ruling on the motion. Farmers Insurance Go. of ldaho v. Talbot, 133 ldaho
428, 431 (Idaho 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Generally, this Court and the district court liberally construe the record in favor of the
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party opposing the motion for summary judgment and draws all reasonable inferences
and conclusions in favor of that party.
This Court has addressed the issue of insurance coverage, holding that:
"Under certain clear cut factual patterns the determination of whether la
person] is, for the purposes of insurance coveraqe, a resident, is a
Questionof law."

AID insurance Co (Mutual) v. Armstrong, 119 ldaho 897, 900 (Ct. App. 1991) citing
Government Employees lnsurance Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672,677 (Utah 1982).
I

When presented with questions of law, this Court has held that

I

"[it] exercises free review and is not bound by findings of the district court,
but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented."

I

Farmers, 133 ldaho at 431. Therefore, this Court exercises free review to determine
whether Jamey Kinsey was a "resident" of his grandmother's household for purposes of
insurance coverage; this Court is not bound by the findings of the district court
IV.

I

LEGAL ARGUMENT
I

A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FARM BUREAU'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THAT BASIS THAT MR. KINSEY HAD
CHANGED HIS RESIDENCE.
The central dispute in this case is whether Jamey Kinsey was a resident of his
grandmother's household at time that Mr. Brookbank collided with Mr. Kinsey's dog. If
Jamey was a resident of his grandmother's household then he is covered by his
grandmother's insurance policy. Alternatively, if he is not a resident of her household
then he is not eligible for insurance coverage.
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B. AMBIGUITIES IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS MUST BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF COVERAGE.

he insurance contract between Farm Bureau and Wilmoth Kinsey provides that
for purposes of coverage, an "insured" means "you or the entity named in the
Declarations" and "if you are an individual, insured also means, if residents of your
household, your spouse, your relatives, or minors in the care of you or your relatives."
(R.18). The contract does not define the terms "residents of your household." These
terms are ambiguous.
As a general rule, "courts interpret the phrase 'resident of the same household' to
extend coverage if this can be done under a reasonable interpretation of the facts." AID
Insurance Co., v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho 897, 901 (Ct. App. 1991). This Court has held
that
"If anv doubt exists the language of the policy will be interpreted aaainst
the insurance companv and in favor of coveraae. Id. If an insurance policy
may be given either of two reasonable meanings, one which permits
recovery and one which does not, the meaning of the more-favorable to
the insured should be adopted.''
Id (internal cites omitted) (emphasis added). Clearly, policy favors the adoption of a
reasonable meaning which permits coverage.
The term "resident" is subject to multiple meanings. On the one hand "resident"
may mean "a member of a family living at that home permanently as one unit headed by
[one member] for their mutual interest and social happiness." See Hardware Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., 241 Cal.App.2d 303, 306 (Cal.App.Dist.1 1966).
Although not explicitly stated, this seems to be 'the definition propounded by Farm
Bureau. On the other hand, the term "resident" may simply require that the "relative
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reside in the household not that he live there permanently as a member of the family."
Id.
Webster's Dictionary defines "resident" as "living in a place for some length of
time," "resident" also means "not migratory." Thus, a "resident of the same household is
"one, other than a temporary or transient visitor, who lives with others in the same
house for a period of some duration, although he may not intend to remain there
permanently." Hardware, 241 Cal.App.2d at 310. This definition is consistent with this
Court's definition of "resident" in Allsfafe Insurance Co. v. Mocaby. 133 Idaho 593, 598
(Idaho 1999). In Mocaby this Court held that the term "resident" connotes a living
arrangement with some degree of permanence." Id. If these is some degree ol
permanence then one is no longer a temporary or transient visitor, rather the person is a
resident even if he does not plan to remain at that location permanently. .
In Mocaby the insurer brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its policy
did not provide liability coverage for the insureds' grandson's allegedly accidental
shooting of the victim. Id at 595.

In that case the grandson went to live with his

grandparents after the grandparents were contacted by the Department of Health and
Welfare. Id.

After the grandson arrived he spent approximately 2 days with his

grandparents and then left the house to stay with some friends. Id. The grandson would
occasionally return to his grandparents' house for a shower, a change of clothes and a
meal. However, he would then leave again to be with his friends. Approximately two
months after his arrival, the grandson allegedly shot a woman in the head at her home
with a gun he'd stolen from a friend. Id.
APPEALLANT BRIEF - 7

The Mocaby Court adopted an objective test for determining "residency" relying
on objective factors rather than subjective testimony. The Court considered the
individual's storage of personal belongs in the named insured's household; custody
arrangements for the minor; the presence or absence of a close continuing connection
between the individual and the insured; the presence of a bedroom kept for the
individual's visits to the household; and the intent of the named insured with respect to
the individual's residence. Id at 598. Ultimately the Mocaby Court held that the factors
weighed against finding that the grandson was a resident of his grandparents'
household.
However, the California Court of Appeals found coverage in a case with facts
almost identical to the facts in this case. In Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Home
Indemnity Co., the California Court of Appeals held that the nephew was a resident of
his aunt and uncle's household for the purposes of insurance coverage. 241 Cal.App.2d
303, 304 (Cal.App.Dist.1, 1996). In Hardware, the nephew (Bowens) was involved in a
motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff was injured. The aunt and uncle's insurance
company appealed a determination that it was liable for defending the nephew because
he was an additional insured on his aunt and uncle's policy. Id at 305-6.
Prior to the accident Bowens and his cousin shared an apartment in Oakland.
Shortly thereafter Bowens' cousin joined the Navy and his cousin's room in his parents'
house was no longer occupied. Id at 309. Approximately 2 weeks before the motor
vehicle collision, Bowens was working in his uncle's garage tinkering with a car trying lo
get it to work. Id. He slept in his aunt and uncle's house the day before the accident. Id
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at 309. He was also unemployed at the time. Id. Additionally Bowens had some clothes
with him but most of them were still in the Oakland apartment. l d a f 310. After the motor
vehicle collision, Bowens stayed at his aunt and uncle's house in Richmond for a period
of 2 weeks after the accident before returning to the apartment. The motor vehicle
collision was investigated by a police officer. Id at 310. The officer testified that when he
spoke with Bowens and asked him where he lived the latter gave him the address in
Richmond. The court inferred that Bowens also had the Richmond address listed on his
driver's license since the officer asked to see Bowens' license and registration. Id.
Additionally, when Bowens arrived at the hospital he gave the hospital his aunt and
uncle's telephone number. Four days after the accident a licensed investigator arrived
at the Richmond address to speak with Bowens; when asked for his address Bowens
again gave his aunt and uncle's Richmond address. Id, The investigator also noticed
that the vehicle registration for a car parked in front of the Richmond address showed
that Bowens was the owner and that his address was his aunt and uncle's Richmond
address. Id at 31 1.
Based on these facts the court held that Bowens was a resident of his aunt and
uncle's household even though he still had an apartment in Oakland. Id at 31 1. These
facts taken together evidenced that Bowens was not merely a transient visitor; on the
contrary, it establishes a close continuous contact between the insureds and the
individual sufficient enough to establ~shthat Bowens was in fact a resident of the
insureds' household.
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C. A PERSON MAY BE A RESIDENT OF MULTIPLE HOUSEHOLDS FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING INSURANCE COVERAGE.
A person, whether a minor or an adult, may be a resident of more than one
household for insurance purposes. AID lnsurance Co., v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho at 902
citing

Mutual Service Casualty lnsurance Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621

(Minn.App.1987). For example, in Olson the insurance company appealed the trial
court's holding that a child was a resident of his mother's household when the child
primarily resided with his father who had custody of the child. Olson, 402 N.W.2d at
621. The insurance company argued that the child could have only one residency and
since the father had custody the child could only be the resident of his father's
household. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected that argument holding that:
"...as a general rule, while a person can have only one domicile, he can
have more than one residence. 28 C.J.S. Domicile 5 2(a) (1941). We see
no reason why a person who meets the criteria for being considered a
resident of an insured's household should be precluded from coverage
solely because he is also a resident of another household."

Olson, 402 N.W.2d at 621 (emphasis added).
The district court failed to consider the fact that an individual such as Jamey
Kinsey may have multiple residences so long as he meets the criteria for being
considered a resident. To the contrary, the district court operated under the premise that
an individual may have only one residency and in fact held that Jamey had changed his
residency. In reality Jamey was a resident of two households. Furthermore, contrary to
the district court's holding, ~ a m e yKinsey met the criteria for being considered a resident
of his grandmother's household.
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This case is in many ways nearly identical to the Hardware case referenced
above. There is no question that Jamey was a resident of his grandmother's household
when he was growing up. On August 18, 2007, the date of the incident, it is conceded
that Jamey was staying at an outbuilding located at his grandmother's property. In
addition to that, Jamey kept his property at that same location, including his money.
This fact illustrates that there was a close relationship between Jamey and the insured.
That fact also indicates that Jamey was not simply a temporary or transient visitor;
rather it is an indication that Jamey was a resident of his grandmother's household.
Jamey's grandmother also paid his bills and made sure that his vehicle
registration remains current. Again, this illustrates that Jamey is not merely a temporary
and transient visitor; he and his grandmother have established a living arrangement
where there is in fact a degree of permanency. in addition, Jamey stored his worldly
possessions at his grandmother's home which is indicative of trust between the parties
which is present in close and personal relationship between the parties. In fact, at the
time of the incident Jamey was looking for his work boot's at the house where he had left
them. The inference is that Jamey believed that his work boots were likely to be at his
grandmother's along with all his other property.
Furthermore, on August 18, 2007, police officers responded to the accident. At
some point the officers spoke to Jamey because under the section identified as
"property damage" the report requires the officer to identify the name of the object that
was struck and the owner's name and address. The report identifies the object that was
struck as an animal owned by Jamey Kinsey whose address was "3497 East 3000
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North, Kimberly, ID 83341 ." Like the officer in Hardware, the police officer in this case
would have had to make contact with Jamey Kinsey at the time of the accident to elicit
that information from him.
Jamey also listed his grandmother's address as his own on his driver's license
and vehicle registration. Had Jamey considered his girlfriend's house as his own he
would have changed the address on his driver's license. By listing his grandmother's
address on his own on his driver's license and registration, Jamey announced to the
public and to the relevant state agencies that he believed himself to reside at that
address. These facts taken together are sufficient to show that Jamey was not merely a
temporary or transient visitor in his grandmother's household, rather it shows that there
was a living arrangement between the two which had some degree of permanency.
Therefore, Jamey was a "resident" of his grandmother's household under one definition
of the term "resident." Consequently, the district court erred in holding that Jamey was
not a resident of his grandmother's household because he had changed his residence.
Moreover, this court has recognized that a person may have multiple residences
for purposes of insurance coverage . This is true in the instant case. Although Jamey
may produce enough subjective statements to establish that he maintains a residence
at his girlfriend's house, the objective facts also support the conclusion that Jamey was
a resident of his grandmother's household as well. In Hardware, defendant Bowens
maintained an apartment in a different city yet that fact did not prevent the court from
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finding that he was nonetheless a resident of his aunt and uncle's household.
Residency does not require long-term permanence. As such the district court erred in
holding that the facts do not support the conclusion that Jamey Kinsey was a resident of
his grandmother's household.
D. CONCLUSION.

It is clear that ambiguous terms such as "resident" are to be construed in favor of
providing insurance coverage if there are different rational meanings for the term. In this

I

case the Appellant contends that one rational definition of a "resident" is a person, other

I

than a temporary or transient visitor, who lives with others in the same house for a

!

period of some duration, although he may not intend to remain there permanently.
When a'person is not a transient or temporary visitor in the insured's household then a
I

living arrangement with some degree of permanence exists. That type of living
arrangement was present in this case. Jamey Kinsey lived at his grandmother's home at
the date of the incident, as he had done other times in h i s past. Jamey stored his
personal belongings and his money at'his grandmother's. His grandmother paid his bills
and made sure he kept his vehicle registration current. Jamey also listed his
grandmother's address as his own on his driver's license, his vehicle registration, and in
his discovery responses. Lastly, he communicated to the officer on the date of the
incident that his address was "3497 East 3000 North, Kimberly, Idaho 83341." These
facts show that Jamey was more than a mere transient visitor - he was a resident of
Wilmoth Kinsey's household.
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Consequently, the Appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse the
district court's ruling and hold that Jamey Kinsey was a resident of his grandmother's
household for purpose of insurance coverage
DATED this 24thday of September, 2009.
JEFFREY J. HEPWORTH, P.A.
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